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ABSTRACT 
The Influence of Banks on Auditor Choice and 
Auditor Reporting in Japan 
by 
JIANG Jin 
Master of Philosophy 
Debt as opposed to equity as the major source of financing and the influence of 
banks on the corporate governance of listed companies are unique features of the 
Japanese business environment. This thesis investigates how these features affect 
the choice of auditor by Japanese listed companies and auditor reporting by 
Japanese CPA firms on those companies. Pong and Kita (2006) provided some 
univariate analyses and indicated that Japanese companies tended to select the 
same external auditors as their main banks to reduce the agency costs. In this 
thesis, I further examine the influence of main banks on auditor selection by 
logistic regression and also investigate the influence of main banks on auditor 
reporting quality after controlling self-selection bias. Using data from Japanese 
listed companies in the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the 2002-2008 period, I 
provide empirical evidence that companies with more reliance on main bank 
loans are more likely to choose their main banks’ external auditors. Using the 
Propensity Score Matching method and the Heckman two-step binary probit 
model to control for self-selection bias, the empirical results support the 
hypothesis that main bank auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to 
the borrowing companies than non-main bank auditors, providing evidence of 
higher audit quality from main bank auditors. As a sensitivity test, I also use 
discretionary accruals as a measure of audit quality. the results indicate that 
companies who choose the same auditors as their main banks have higher audit 
quality than companies who choose different auditors from their main banks. My 
thesis contributes to the existing auditing literature in several ways. First, by 
studying the influence of debt financing on auditor choice and auditor reporting, 
this thesis extends the auditor market research that focuses mainly on the role of 
auditors in equity markets to the bank-based market. Furthermore, this thesis also 
complements auditing research on the influence of institutions on audit quality. 
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The Influence of Banks on Auditor Choice and Auditor Reporting in Japan 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis examines how the influences from banks affect auditor choice and 
auditor reporting in Japan’s audit market. Specifically, I study whether auditor 
choice of listed companies in Japan is influenced by banks that provide these 
companies with major debt financing and whether auditor reporting by Japanese 
CPA firms on borrowing companies is influenced by banks who hire the same 
auditors as the borrowing companies.  
Prior research that examines auditor choice and auditor reporting has primarily 
focused on the audit markets in the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and other countries 
where companies rely heavily on well-developed equity markets for external 
financing.  The research generally indicates that audits serve to monitor 
management, contributing to the firms’ overall corporate governance, and thereby 
protecting shareholders’ interests (e.g., Francis and Wilson, 1988). However, there 
is limited empirical research that examines the effectiveness of external audits in 
markets where debt is a more important source of corporate financing than equity 
capital. In Japan, the financial system is well known for being predominantly 
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bank-based and companies rely heavily on bank loans for external financing. In this 
situation, the major agency problem exists between managers and creditors, while 
the major agency problem in equity market-oriented countries is between managers 
and shareholders. In addition, many banks in Japan are also shareholders of the 
borrowing companies, thus creating a unique role for banks in the corporate 
governance of these companies. The institutional environment of Japan presents an 
interesting arena for the study of auditor choice and auditor reporting. 
In equity market-oriented countries, external auditors serve to mitigate the 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. However, in these countries, 
non-controlling shareholders and other stakeholders often do not have adequate 
influence on managers to select their preferred external auditors. The controlling 
shareholders who have concentrated ownership and influential roles in corporate 
governance may choose low quality auditors in order to capitalize and sustain the 
opaque gains derived from weak internal corporate governance (Copley and 
Douthett, 2002; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996). The assurance of audit 
quality in this situation is mainly through imposed regulations, quality standards of 
the audit firms themselves, corporate governance of the auditees and perhaps a 
relatively high litigation risk.  
In Japan, many companies depend extensively on debt financing through bank 
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loans. Many companies have a main bank which is often the largest creditor and a 
shareholder of the company. The main bank is not only the major source of 
financing but also has a significant role in the corporate governance of the 
borrowing companies. Before the 1980s, the main banks had dominant power in the 
Japanese economy and corporate governance, and they could have access to the 
private information of the borrowing companies easily and directly participated in 
firm management through placing bank employees on boards of directors. Since the 
1980s, several Japanese financial liberalization programs including the 1996 “Big 
Bang” program have been promoted to relax the rules and regulations governing 
capital markets with an aim to make equity markets more open and free, thus 
encouraging companies to make greater use of equity financing. As a result of these 
liberalization programs, the main banks have lost their dominant power in the 
Japanese economy, as companies started to switch to equity financing (Osaki, 2005). 
However, banks still play an important role in corporate financing.   
Extant literature has paid little attention to whether the main banks do rely on 
external auditors to enhance their monitoring of the borrowing companies and 
whether the main banks  influence  the selection of the external auditors of 
borrowing companies. Pong and Kita (2006) provided descriptive statistics on the 
influence of main banks on companies’ auditor choice for the year 2000. They 
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found that companies in Japan tend to select the same external auditors as their 
main banks. However, they just did some univariate analysis and did not establish 
econometric model to run multivariate regression. 
In this thesis, I provide an in-depth empirical examination of the influence of a 
company’s main bank on the auditor choice of the company and on auditor 
reporting behavior in Japan for the period 2002-2008. Based on agency theory, I 
expect that the more important the role of main banks in the borrowing companies’ 
financing and corporate governance, the more likely that the borrowing companies 
will select their main banks’ auditors as their external auditors. That is, the more 
dependence the companies have on main bank loans compared to equity, the more 
likely that the companies will select the same auditor as their main bank due to 
influences from the bank and the past economic relationship between the bank and 
the auditor. Given the bank’s confidence in its auditor, using the same auditor as the 
bank could reduce default risk and consequently lower the cost of debt capital for 
the borrowing company.  In addition, I expect main banks to influence the quality 
of auditor reporting as the bank is eager to know whether the borrowing company 
has continued to meet debt covenants. If the audit quality of the borrowing 
company’s auditor cannot satisfy the requirements of the main bank, the main bank 
may pressure the borrowing company to fire the auditor. In addition, the auditor 
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may also lose the business as the external auditor of the main bank. Thus, given that 
main bank auditors will have much to lose if they do not provide quality audits, they 
should be more likely to issue modified opinions to the borrowing companies when 
appropriate, compared with the situation where the bank and the borrowing 
company choose different auditors. 
I test my hypotheses by analyzing companies listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange during the period 2002-2008. Consistent with my expectations, I find that 
companies with higher bank loans relative to equity are more likely to choose their 
main bank’s external auditor as their own  auditor, after controlling for other firm 
characteristic variables expected to affect auditor selection. Moreover, using the 
propensity score matching method and the Heckman two-step binary probit model 
to correct self-selection bias, I find that main bank auditors are more likely to issue 
qualified opinions than non-main bank auditors, indicating higher audit quality. 
My thesis contributes to the existing auditing literature in several ways. First, 
there is little research that examines the demand for quality audits as a corporate 
governance mechanism in countries where company financing relies mainly on 
bank loans rather than on the equity market. By studying the influence of debt 
financing on auditor choice and auditor reporting, this thesis extends the audit 
market research that focuses mainly on the role of auditors in equity markets to the 
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bank-based market. Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) study the role of external audits 
in Germany where companies also rely heavily on bank loans and find a positive 
relation between German companies’ demand for quality audits and the interest of 
creditors. However, they did not specifically address the impact of creditors on 
auditor reporting. I complement their research by studying the influence of banks on 
auditor choice and auditor reporting in the unique institutional setting of Japan. 
Furthermore, this thesis complements auditing research on the influence of 
institutions on audit quality.  For example, Chan, Lin and Wong (2010) study how 
institutional features such as the extent of state ownership, the maturity of capital 
markets and legal systems affect auditors’ reporting decisions and find that a weaker 
institutional environment results in lower quality audits. Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) 
examine how auditor reporting is affected by political-economic institutions in 
China and conclude that government influence can reduce the audit quality of local 
auditors. However, I should point out that the political-economic institutions in 
China are very different from those in Japan.  The interest of government owners 
of listed companies in China is also very different from the interest of major 
creditors of Japanese companies. However, I echo their findings that the 
institutional environment can have a significant impact on audit quality. 
My study suggests that auditors in Japan play a monitoring role to mitigate the 
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conflicts between the management of the borrowing companies and their creditors 
(main banks), and that these companies will choose a suitable auditor to lower the 
cost of debt capital. Previous research mainly emphasizes the signaling effect of 
audit quality differentiation and indicates that hiring a high-quality auditor will be a 
signal of good corporate governance and credible financial reporting to investors 
(Palmrose, 1984). For my study, if borrowing companies choose the same external 
auditors as their main banks, they could improve the expectations of the main banks 
regarding the monitoring function of auditors, provide a signal to the major 
creditors on the quality of their financial reporting and mitigate the information 
asymmetry between the main banks and the borrowing companies, which will 
eventually lower the cost of debt capital for them. This unique agency relationship 
among company management, creditors (main banks) and auditors in Japan is quite 
different from the agency relationship among corporate management, shareholders 
and auditors in other well developed equity-oriented markets. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the 
relevant institutional background in Japan and Chapter 3 develops the research 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the research method. Chapter 5 discusses the 
empirical results and the sensitivity tests and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
 
2.1 Financial reporting and auditing in Japan 
The Japanese accounting system is based on the “Financial Accounting Standards 
for Business Enterprises” which integrates the Japanese Commercial Code (JCC), 
Stock Exchange Law (SEL), and tax regulations. Under the JCC, corporations are 
required to provide annual financial statements to shareholders in accordance with 
its prescribed accounting rules. Under the SEL, corporations which offer securities 
to the public are required to file a registration statement containing audited financial 
statements with the Ministry of Finance (Taylor, 1997).    
 Large companies in Japan typically employ two types of auditors: corporate 
auditors and independent auditors. Corporate auditors are employees of a company 
elected at the shareholders’ meeting and they do not need to be certified public 
accountants. Very often, companies establish a board of corporate auditors to 
monitor the activities of management in the discharge of their duties and also try to 
ensure that no fraud or illegal act takes place (Pong and Kita, 2006). However, the 
effectiveness of corporate auditors has been questioned due to their frequent lack of 
independence from top management and their inability to prevent or detect frauds 
committed by management (Fukukawa, Mock and Wright, 2006). Thus, external 
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auditors are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate auditors and audit the 
companies’ financial statements (Fukukawa, Mock and Wright, 2006). 
An important feature of the Japanese audit market is the strong presence of Big 
4 audit firms through alliances with one or more large Japanese audit firms. The 
concentration level of the Big 4 in the Japanese audit market for listed companies 
was 84% in 2007 (Grant Thornton, 2007). This is a high level of concentration, 
although lower than that in the US and the UK which have both been over 95% in 
recent years (Grant Thornton, 2007).  
Another important characteristic of the history of the Japanese audit market is 
that there has been relatively little auditor litigation as the country is much less 
litigious than the U.S. (Wingate, 1997; Ginsburg and Hoetker, 2004).  However, 
litigation does occur and can have potentially devastating consequences for CPA 
firms. For example, in 2006, ChuoAoyama, a  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
affiliate in Japan, was involved in a major accounting fraud. In May 2006, the 
Financial Services Agency suspended the operations of ChuoAoyama (Skinner and 
Srinivasan, 2010). This suspension caused the loss of almost 30 percent of  
ChuoAoyama’s clients (The Daily Yomiuri, 2006)1. Thus, the litigation against 
ChuoAoyama caused reputation loss and serious damage to the market share of 
PwC in Japan. 
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2.2 Characteristics of the Japanese capital market 
Between the Second World War and the 1980s, one traditional feature of the 
Japanese economy was the dominance of Keiretsu conglomerate groups, which 
provided a network for information-sharing and business combinations for their 
corporate member companies (Ouandlous and Philippatos, 1999). Most companies 
in Japan either belonged to the Keiretsu or were affiliated with group members of 
the Keiretsu. Corporate groupings composing the Keiretsu had reciprocal ownership 
interests, long term business contractual arrangements and close financial ties to 
Japanese banks, which were usually regarded as the core of each Keiretsu group. 
The major source of corporate financing was bank loans (Ouandlous and 
Philippatos, 1999). 
Typically, most Japanese companies have a main bank, which is often the 
largest provider of debt financing (Morck et al., 2000; Hoshi et al., 1990). In 
addition, the main bank usually acts as a shareholder of the borrowing companies. 
Until recently, the banks in Japan were only allowed to hold a maximum of 5% of 
the shares in the borrowing companies. This proportion may seem relatively small. 
However, viewed from the power of Keiretsu groupings where the main banks and 
other companies often exchange equity shares with each other to form stable 
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shareholding blocks, this small holding can give the main bank an opportunity to 
exert a significant influence over the corporate governance of the borrowing 
companies (Bies, 2003). Thus, main banks in Japan can play a significant role in 
corporate governance of companies through simultaneously holding debt and 
ownership stakes and they frequently exert control through direct and indirect 
involvement in the management of their borrowing companies. For instance, banks 
may place their employees on the board of directors of the borrowing companies. 
The role of the main bank in the Japanese economy has led to stable and long-term 
relationships between Japanese banks and their corporate clients, in contrast to the 
banks in the U.S. or other western economies whose relationships with their 
corporate clients are often described as short-term, less stable and more costly 
(Ouandlous and Philippatos, 1999). For borrowing companies, having a main bank 
provides more stability and less fluctuations in cash flows compared with 
bank-independent companies (Hoshi et al., 1990). Even when the borrowing 
companies are in financial distress, the main bank can continue to deliver debt 
financing to rescue them and prevent them from bankruptcy (Sheard, 1989). During 
the period between Second World War and the 1980s, the core status of the main 
banks in Keiretsu Groups and the borrowing companies’ significant economic 
dependence on them gave the main banks a dominant role in corporate governance. 
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The close ties that a main bank had with its customers gave it relatively easy access 
to private information in the borrowing companies. Thus the information gap 
between the main bank and its customers narrowed, which resulted in relatively less 
demand for high quality external auditing during that period. (Hoshi and Kashyap, 
2001; Skinner and Srinivasan, 2010).   
During the 1990s, ongoing economic problems in the Japanese economy 
necessitated a process of reforms in financial systems (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). 
As a consequence of the Japanese Big Bang reform in 1996, the relaxation of 
regulations in capital markets resulted in a shift toward equity from debt financing 
and easier access to raising capital by issuing shares, especially for some big and 
stable manufacturing corporations. The Japanese Big Bang program was supposed 
to have been completed by the end of March 2001 (Osaki, 2005). After a series of 
financial deregulation and liberalization programs during the 1990s, companies in 
Japan had more opportunities to obtain  external financing from capital markets, 
especially from institutional  and foreign investors. Consequently , the ownership 
interests of main banks in borrowing companies generally became smaller. The 
main banks gradually lost their dominant power in the corporate governance of the 
borrowing companies. They can no longer access the private information of 
borrowing companies or participate in corporate governance as easily. Therefore, 
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they must rely more on external auditors as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate 
moral hazard problems in the borrowing companies.   
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses Development 
 
In this section, I develop two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis examines the 
influence of main banks on auditor choice by Japanese listed firms. The second 
hypothesis examines audit quality for borrowing companies that use the same 
external auditors as their main banks. I develop the above hypotheses from the 
following perspectives. 
 
3.1 Agency theory and the monitoring role of audits 
Prior research uses agency theory to explain the demand for audit services as a 
monitoring function to improve the principal-agent contractual relationship (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Agency theory 
helps explain the utility of audit services in terms of the role of audited financial 
statements in the contractual arrangements among managers, shareholders and 
debtholders (Palmrose, 1984). Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss the agency costs 
generated by the divergence between managers’ interests and those of bondholders, 
and suggest that bondholders will realize that managers’ interests diverge from 
theirs; hence, the price investors will pay for bonds will reflect the effect of 
divergence between the managers’ interests and theirs. Therefore, managers have 
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incentives to establish various covenants in indenture provisions to constraint their 
behavior in order to reduce the agency conflicts and hence increase bond prices.  
In my analysis, the main banks will also take into account the effect of 
divergence between managers’ interests and their own  in determining the interest 
rates for loans. Managers will therefore find it in their interests to include various 
accounting-based covenants in lending agreements with the main bank to reduce 
agency costs and hence lower the interest rates that main banks charge. The 
enforcement of such accounting-based debt covenants creates a demand for audited 
financial statements and managers have incentives to employ a reliable independent 
external auditor to demonstrate that they will not manipulate the financial 
information or take actions to harm principals’ interests (Watts, 1977; Chow, 1982; 
Francis and Wilson, 1988). Auditors lend credibility to financial information 
provided by management and help reduce management incentives and opportunities 
for exploiting information asymmetry (Palmrose, 1984). However, auditors are also 
agents and audit effort is unobservable, leading to a moral hazard problem and a 
new source of inefficiency (Palmrose, 1984; Antle, 1984; Baiman et al., 1991). The 
principal (main bank) will anticipate this new agency problem and consider the 
perceived efforts and quality of auditors of borrowing companies and incorporate 
their expectations into the contract price with borrowing companies. The extent to 
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which an audit will reduce agency costs depends on the level of independence and 
competence of the auditor (Watt and Zimmerman, 1983; Antle, 1984). The 
differences in managers’ incentives and opportunities to exploit the information 
asymmetry for their own interests imply differences in the demand for audit service 
quality (Palmrose, 1984).  
Many studies have investigated an  association between agency cost variables 
and the selection of quality-differentiated auditors. DeFond (1992) finds a positive 
relationship between the percentage of debt in the capital structure and the selection 
of auditors with higher brand name reputation. Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) 
examine auditor choice in the German audit market and find that debtholders have a 
greater demand for audit market leaders than for other auditors. Thus, the greater is 
the need for monitoring, the higher the quality of auditors is demanded (Palmrose, 
1984). As Japanese firms typically have a high level of debt in the capital structure, 
high quality audits should be needed to improve the credibility of accounting 
information and to verify compliance with debt covenants.  
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability of detecting and 
reporting material financial statement errors and concludes that the larger the size of 
an audit firm, the more likely it will supply a high level of audit quality. Prior 
auditing research usually treats the Big 4 (previously Big N) auditing firms as a 
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homogeneous brand-name group with high auditing quality (Palmrose, 1984; 
DeFond, 1992). The audit market in Japan is dominated by Big 4 audit firms who 
audit more than 80 percent of listed firms in Japan. As almost all big banks in Japan 
employ the Big 4 as their external auditors, I further expect that the main bank will 
treat their external auditors as important watch dogs in monitoring borrowing 
companies. Compared to non-main bank auditors, main-bank auditors should be 
more likely to signal their willingness to act in the interests of the main bank 
through making their greatest efforts to testify to the fairness of the financial 
information and report any breaches of debt covenants. An added incentive for 
main-bank auditors to report truthfully is provided by the economic connection they 
have with the main bank; monitoring the borrowing company well simultaneously 
maintains their position as the external auditor of the main bank and improves their 
chances of being selected as the external auditors of other clients of the main bank. 
Therefore, the external auditor of a main bank should be the preferred auditor that 
the main bank can trust and rely on. From the perspective of the borrowing 
company, the manager has incentives to hire the external auditors of the main bank 
to improve the expectations of the main bank and reduce the interest rates of bank 
loans.
2
 As the main bank loans represent a significant part of total bank loans, lower 
interest rates of main bank loans will lead to lower interest rates of total bank 
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loans.
3
 The larger the percentage of debt capital, the more benefits the borrowing 
company will gain. Thus, I expect that the larger the proportion of main bank loans 
compared to equity capital, the more likely that the company will choose the same 
auditors as its main bank to reduce the costs of debt capital, as reflected in the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: The higher a company’s bank loans relative to its equity, the more likely the 
company will choose its main bank’s external auditor as its own external auditor. 
 
3.2 Auditor Reporting 
Companies may have incentives to collude with auditors to manipulate financial 
statements to get opaque gains and to prevent declines in share price. Listed 
companies in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in Japan have incentives to make 
side-contracts with auditors to facilitate their meeting of the TSE’s Criteria for 
Assignment to the First Section Market
4 
or to avoid delisting. From the perspective 
of auditors, they may benefit from collusion with clients through gaining higher 
audit fees and maintaining client relationships. Thus, they may allow clients to 
manipulate the financial statements and not issue a modified opinion, which may 
lead to an increase in capital costs and trigger reassignment from First Section 
Market to Second Section Market or even delisting. Meanwhile, the auditors could 
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also bear the risk of incurring the cost of reputation loss and litigation. However, as 
mentioned above, in Japan litigation costs to auditors are essentially non-existent 
and thus, the legal system does not provide sufficient incentives for auditors to 
deliver quality audits, and reputation costs are very important in the Japanese audit 
market (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2010). In this aspect, the Japanese audit market is 
similar to that of China (Chan and Wu, 2010). As explained earlier, main bank 
auditors face even higher reputation costs because the main banks may influence the 
borrowing companies to fire them and they may also lose their positions as external 
auditors of the main bank. Furthermore, the main banks are usually the center of the 
Keiretsu group. The main banks may threaten their external auditors by asking all 
their borrowing clients not to use their audit services if they cheated the main banks. 
On the other hand, if the external auditor of a main bank does a good job, the 
external auditor may make significant inroads into the whole network around the 
main bank and get a substantial reputation gain. Therefore, the external auditor of a 
main bank has significant incentives to offer a high quality audit services for the 
borrowing companies of the main bank. Conversely, the main bank auditors have 
more reputation costs to incur if there is an audit failure. Thus, compared to 
non-main bank auditors, the main bank auditors should be  less likely to collude 
with the managers of borrowing companies. This line of reasoning suggests the 
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following hypothesis: 
H2: Compared to non-main banks’ external auditors, main banks’ external auditors 
are more likely to provide higher quality audits to borrowing companies. 
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Chapter 4 Research Method 
 
4.1 Data collection 
I collected auditor identities, audit opinion types, and client firm characteristics of 
listed Japanese companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange  for 2002-2008 from the 
Osiris Database (Bureau Vandijk Company). The 2002-2008 period was chosen 
because the Big Bang reform program was supposed to complete by 2001 (Osaki, 
2005). And this period allowed me to examine the influence of banks on auditor 
choice and auditor reporting during a period when the banks had lost their dominant 
power but still maintained a significant influence over borrowing companies. 
Following Morck et al. (2000) and Hoshi et al. (1990), I take the largest lender 
in each year as the main bank for each company. I obtained the name of largest 
lenders and the number of main bank loans from the Needs Database (Nikkei Inc.). 
In Japan, two or more banks often belong to one Financial Group and hire the same 
external auditors. In such cases, I treat the entire Financial Group as one main bank 
and sum the loans of each member bank to get the total main bank loans for a 
company.
 
The Appendix provides information on the auditors of the main banks. 
In my analysis, I excluded companies with missing financial or audit data.  I 
also exclude financial institutions and insurance companies because they have 
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different financial reporting requirements. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the sample 
consists of 2095 firm-year observations of Japanese listed companies over the 
2002-2008 sample period. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for auditor 
choice over the period of the study. On average, 32 percent of companies have the 
same external auditors as their main banks. Panel C of Table 1 provides statistics for 
the type of audit opinions issued. Following previous empirical studies (e.g., Chan 
et al., 2006), I classify qualified opinions, adverse opinions and disclaimers as 
“modified” opinions and in my sample, there were only 5 adverse opinions and 
disclaimers combined. As shown in Table 1, the percent of modified opinions 
decreased dramatically since the year 2002. One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that in April, 1999, Japanese accounting standards began a process 
of reforming, which is often called “Bing Bang reform of accounting standards” 
(Asami, 2006).  As it took some years for Japanese companies to adapt to the new 
accounting standards, this could explain why  the percentage of modified opinions 
is relatively high during the early years of my sample.  Panel D shows the 
descriptive statistics on the frequencies of modified versus clean opinions that main 
bank and non-main bank auditors issued during the sample period. On average, 
main bank auditors issued more modified opinions than did non-main bank auditors 
(4.8% vs. 3.4%). This difference is 4.8 percent vs. 3.0 percent after correcting for 
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self-selection as explained later. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2 Model specification 
In this study, I use two logistic regression models to test the auditor choice and the 
auditor reporting decisions. 
Auditor _choice = ß0 + ß1 MBankloan_equity + ß2 Size + ß3 ROA + ß4 Leverage 
+ß5 Market + ß6 No.Subsidiary + ß7 Current_ratio + ß8 
Inventory + ß9 Growth + ß10 year2007 + ß11 year2008 + ε                
(1)                   
Auditor_opinion = ß0 + ß1 Auditor _choice + ß2 Size + ß3 ROA + ß4 Leverage  
+ ß5 Current_ratio + ß6 Beta +ß7 Inventory  
+ ß8 Opinion_lag + ß9 Market + ß10 Loss + ε  (2) 
The dependent variable for Model (1), Auditor_choice, equals 1 if the external 
auditor of the borrowing company is the same as its main bank, and 0 otherwise.
5 
The test variable MBankloan_equity, which is the ratio of main bank loans to equity, 
measures the degree of a company’s reliance on its main bank for debt financing. 
The larger the MBankloan_equity, the more the company depends on main bank 
loans rather than equity, and I hypothesized that as this ratio increases, companies 
will be more likely to choose the same external auditor as their main bank.  
The dependent variable for Model (2), Auditor_opinion, equals 1 for modified 
opinions and 0 otherwise. I use the frequency of modified opinions to measure audit 
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quality.  Several studies (DeFond et al., 2000; Chan et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2008) 
suggest that the frequency of modified opinions has reasonable power to capture 
variations in audit quality in different research settings. DeAngelo (1981) defined 
audit quality as the joint probability that a given auditor will both discover 
(competence) and report (independence) a beach on a given client’s audit. Auditors 
with greater independence are expected to be more resilient to client pressure to 
issue a clean audit report when a modified report is appropriate (DeFond et al., 
2000). The test variable in model (2), Auditor_choice, is the same as the dependent 
variable in Model (1). I expect that the main bank auditors are more likely to issue 
modified opinions to the borrowing companies. 
 
4.3 Control variables for Model (1) 
I include company characteristic variables, such as client size, current ratio, 
leverage and return on total assets, which reflect the financial condition of the firms 
(Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1987), in the Auditor_choice model. I use the 
logarithm of the company’s year-end total assets to proxy for client size. Larger 
corporations, which are well known and established in the market place, are more 
able to attract investors in the equity market (Ouandlous and Philippatos, 1999).  
In contrast, smaller corporations must rely more heavily on loans from their main 
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banks than larger corporations and thus should be more likely to hire the same 
auditors as their main banks. Hence, I expect the sign of the Size coefficient to be 
negative. I include ROA (net income before tax over year-end total assets) to 
measure companies’ profitability. Several prior studies have found that firm 
performance (profitability) may affect the choice of auditors (e.g., Sainty et al., 
2002). More profitable companies are more likely to hire their main banks’ auditors 
to testify to their performance to the main bank.  
As mentioned above, the stocks listed in the TSE are separated into the First 
Section for larger and better performing companies and the Second Section for 
mid-sized companies. Thus, I include the variable Market (First vs. Second section) 
to reflect different auditor choice behaviors of companies listed in these two market 
sections and expect that companies in the First Section are more likely to select the 
main bank auditor. Palmrose (1984) indicates that the complexity and diversity of 
an organization’s activities and operations influence agency costs. Complexity and 
diversity mean a potential for increases in the number of agency relationships as 
well as the remoteness of principals from the observation of agents’ actions. 
Accordingly, I include the number of subsidiaries in the auditor choice model to 
capture organizational diversity and complexity, and expect that the more 
subsidiaries a company has, the more likely it will choose its main bank auditor to 
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reduce agency costs.  
To control for the overall level of debt, I use the leverage variable, which is the 
ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets and expect that companies with  
higher leverage will be more dependent on their main bank and thus more likely to 
choose the main bank auditor as a significant part of the total liability normally 
consists of bank loans.  To control for short-term financial liquidity, I use the 
current ratio (current_ratio) in the auditor choice model and expect that companies 
with higher financial liquidity have less reliance on main bank loans and are thus 
less likely to choose the same external auditors as their main banks. I also consider 
the ratio of inventory to year-end total assets as it reflects companies’ financial 
condition, i.e., a higher ratio, ceteris paribus, indicates a weaker financial condition. 
Thus, I expect that companies with a high ratio of inventory to total assets will be 
more likely to choose their main bank’s external auditor to lower their capital costs.  
Anderson et al. (2004) report that firms with greater growth potential inclined 
to choose high-quality auditors in order to benefit from the signaling effect and 
enhance their reputation. I proxy for growth by the ratio of total sales of the current 
year divided by total sales of the previous year. I expect that companies with high 
growth potential are more likely to choose the main bank’s auditors. I also control 
for the year effect in 2007 and 2008. As previously discussed, in 2006, 
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ChuoAoyama Audit Corporation, PwC's Japanese affiliate, was suspended by the 
Financial Services Agency. In 2007, Misuzu, which is a new name for 
ChuoAoyama after resuming operation, was dissolved because of additional 
accounting frauds. These two events may have influenced companies’ auditor 
choice in 2007 and 2008 respectively. For example, assume the external auditor of 
one company is PwC before 2007 while its main bank’s auditor is KPMG. This 
company may be reluctant to change its external auditor from PwC to KPMG 
before the PwC scandals occurred, because it may have established a long-term 
relationship with PwC and felt it would  be costly to terminate this relationship.  
However, the company should be more willing to switch its auditor from PwC to 
KPMG in 2007 or 2008 because of the PwC scandals.  
4.4 Control variables for Model (2) 
Financial characteristic variables are also included in the opinion model. As larger 
companies tend to be more financially stable than smaller companies and more 
profitable companies are less likely to manipulate financial statements than others 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006), I expect that Size and ROA will be 
negatively associated with the probability of receiving a modified opinion (Chen et 
al., 2001; Schwartz and Menon, 1985). For profitability, I also include a dummy 
variable loss which equals 1 if the net income before tax is less than zero. For 
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financial liquidity, I expect that companies with higher leverage will be more likely 
to receive modified opinions, while companies with higher current ratios will be 
less likely to receive modified opinions. The ratio of inventory to total assets is also 
considered as it suggests that a modified opinion is more likely if a firm is in poor 
financial condition.  
Prior studies find that audit opinion type is highly persistent (Lennox, 1999, 
2000). Consequently, I include the type of opinion in the previous fiscal year and 
expect that companies that received modified opinions in the previous year will be 
more likely to receive modified opinions in the current year. As mentioned above, 
the companies listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange are separated into the First and 
Second Section Markets based on company size and performance. Thus, I also 
include the variable Market in the audit opinion model and expect that companies in 
the First Section Market are less likely to receive qualified opinions. According to 
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987), market returns  capture information 
above and beyond that reported in the financial statements and auditors may use 
market return measures to infer information incorporated in market prices. Thus, I 
include a stock market variable Beta, a key parameter in the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), as a potential determinant of auditor opinions. Beta measures the 
return on a company’s stock in relation to the market as a whole.  I expect that the 
29 
 
higher a company’s expected market return (the larger value of Beta), the less likely 
the firm will obtain a qualified audit report. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive 
statistics on the regression variables and variable definitions used.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.5 Matched propensity score 
The test variable Auditor_choice in model (2) is the dependent variable in model (1) 
and the exogeneity of this variable, is based on the assumption that client firms 
randomly choose their audit firms (Ireland and Lennox, 2002). However, Model (1) 
indicates that companies may self-select their preferred auditors according to firm 
characteristics and other unobservable variables. This may cause a potential 
self-selection bias if the estimation procedures of OLS ignore the issue of 
non-random selection of auditors (Maddala, 1991). The traditional approach to 
control for self-selection bias in the accounting and auditing literature is the 
two-step Heckman selection model. In the first step the researcher uses instruments 
to estimate the inverse Mills’ ratio (IMR), the ratio of the probability density 
function over the cumulative distribution function of a distribution, which is 
commonly applied in regression analysis to take account of selection bias. In the 
second step the IMRs are included in the primary model of interest as a control for 
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the effects of self-selection (Greene, 1981). Researchers usually use the two-step 
Heckman selection model to control for selectivity with respect to the company’s 
choice of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors (e.g., Khurana and Raman, 2004).  
Francis and Lennox (2008) examine the potential pitfalls associated with using 
the Heckman procedure to control for self-selection bias and assess its application 
in accounting research. They demonstrate that the selection model is quite sensitive 
to minor changes in model specification and they suggest the use of matched 
propensity scores as an alternative approach to the two-step Heckman model to 
control for self-selection bias. Clatworthy, Makepeace, and Peel (2009) also find 
that Heckman two-step corrections for selection bias in audit fee models concerning 
Big 4 audit premiums are very sensitive to the model specification and the sample 
used. They also employ the propensity matching methods to deal with the 
self-selection problem.  
Following the methods they used, I create a matched sample based on the 
predicted probabilities from the auditor choice logistic regression using the nearest 
neighbor matching method. In my analysis, the companies choosing main bank 
auditors are matched to those choosing non-main bank auditors on the basis of the 
predicted probability of employing a main bank auditor. I first predict the 
propensity for a company to choose a main bank auditor based on the auditor choice 
31 
 
model and then sort the sample by the predicted probabilities. For each company in 
the experimental sample (to-be-matched company) actually having the same auditor 
as its main bank, I identify two adjacent companies (candidate companies) that have 
the closest predicted probability as potential matches. I then employ the following 
matching rule: (a) if only one of the two candidate companies has a different auditor 
from the main bank, I choose that one as the matching company, (b) if both 
candidate companies have different auditors from their main banks, I choose the one 
with the closest predicted probability, (c) if both candidate companies have the 
same auditors as their main banks, I determine that there is no suitable match and 
drop this “to-be-matched” company. I apply this rule to each “to-be-matched” 
company actually choosing a main bank auditor and create matching pairs. If two 
matching pairs share the same matching company which actually has no non-main 
bank auditor, I keep the matched pair with the smaller difference in predicted 
probabilities. The goal of this rule is to ensure that the sample of firms choosing the 
same auditor as their main banks have similar characteristics as the sample of firms 
choosing different auditors. The mean value of absolute difference in the propensity 
scores of each matched pair is 0.00016, and the maximum value is 0.0089, so 
companies choosing main bank auditors and companies choosing non-main bank 
auditors are very closely matched. Through this propensity score matching, I obtain 
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1130 firm-year observations in the subsample. Then I estimate the logistic model 
for auditor opinion using the companies in the matched-pair sub-sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Chapter 5 Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on auditor opinions and company 
characteristics by auditor type based on 2095 firm-year observations over the 
sample period 2002-2008. Significant differences can be found between the two 
auditor types along three company characteristics, namely MBank_equity, Leverage 
and Market. Consistent with my expectations, companies choosing the same 
auditors as their main banks are more likely to have a higher ratio of bank loans to 
equity, to have higher leverage, and to be included in the First Section Market. 
Although the two-tailed P-value is not significant for the audit opinion mean test, 
the mean value of audit opinion for companies choosing main bank auditors is 
significantly more than the mean value of audit opinion for companies choosing 
non-main bank auditors indicating that main bank auditors render more modified 
audit opinions. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2 Auditor Choice 
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for the auditor choice model. All of 
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the significant coefficients in the model are in the expected directions. As predicted 
by H1, and indicated by the significant positive coefficient for the test variable, 
MBankloan_equity, companies with higher ratios of main bank loans to equity are 
more likely to choose the same auditors as their main banks. The results support the 
hypothesis that the more dependent companies are on main bank loans, the more 
likely they will choose their main banks’ external auditors to lower their capital 
costs. The coefficient of the Market variable is significant at the 1 percent level, 
which indicates that companies which are in the First Section Market are more 
likely to choose the same external auditors as their main banks.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3 Auditor Opinion 
Table 5 presents the mean values of firm characteristics included in the auditor 
choice and auditor opinion models partitioned by auditor type for the matched-pair 
subsample with 1130 firm-year observations. There is no significant difference in 
firm characteristics included in two models, which indicates that the self-selection 
bias has been corrected very well through the propensity score matching process.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 presents the empirical results for the auditor opinion Model for both 
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the original sample with 2095 firm-year observations and the matched-pair 
subsample with 1130 firm-year observations. The coefficients for Auditor_choice in 
both the original sample and the Propensity Matching Score sub-sample after 
correcting for self-selection bias are significant at the 5 percent level. The results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that main bank auditors are more likely to issue 
modified opinions. As predicted, previous audit opinions correlate with current 
audit opinions.  Smaller and less profitable firms are more likely to receive 
modified opinions. Companies in the First Section Market are less likely to receive 
qualified opinions than those in the Second Section Market. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.4 Sensitivity Tests 
Four sets of sensitivity tests were conducted to examine the robustness of the 
empirical results. First, I employ the Heckman two-step model to control the 
self-selection bias. A major limitation of the Propensity Score Matching approach is 
that matching is based only on observable variables and so it cannot control for 
self-selection based on the unobservable variables (Heckman et al., 1997). Some 
unobservable factors could influence both auditor choice and auditor opinion, such 
as company policy and culture. Heckman (1979) derives a two-step method to 
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correct for selectivity bias in linear regression models with normal errors, and 
Dubin and Rivers (1989) employ the same basic conceptual framework to probit 
and logit models, developing a two-stage binary probit/logit method to control for 
self-selection bias in discrete-choice models. To address the self-selection problem, 
I first simplify my model as follows: 
Auditor Choice Equation: Auditor_Choice=αX+βZ+μ 
Auditor Opinion Equation: Auditor_Opinion=δAuditor_Choice+γZ+θW+ε; 
Where X is a vector of variables that only affect auditor choice but have no direct 
effect on auditor Opinion, and Z is a vector of variables that affect both auditor 
choice and auditor opinion. W is a vector of variables that only affect auditor 
opinion but have no direct effect on auditor choice, while u and ε are error terms 
correlated with each other. 
In the first step, I construct the Inverse of Mills ratio (Imills – different 
notation from what you used on a prior page), λ1and λ0 respectively, from the 
auditor choice probit model. Then, for companies choosing main bank auditors 
(Auditor_choice=1), the auditor opinion equation is: 
[Auditor_opinion|Auditor_choice=1,Z,W]=δ+γZ+θW+ρбε +ε (3) 
For companies choosing Non-main bank auditors (Auditor_Choice=0), the auditor 
opinion equation is: 
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[Auditor_opinion|Auditor_choice=0,Z,W]=δ+γZ+θW+ρбε +ε  (4) 
Where φ (•) and Φ (•) are the normal density and cumulative distribution functions, 
respectively:  λ0 =   , λ1= 
   
 
I combine equations (3) and (4) into the auditor opinion logit model: 
Auditor_opinion=δ Auditor_Choice +γ Z+ θ W + Imills + ε 
Thus, in the second step, I add the Inverse Mills ratio in the auditor opinion 
logit model to correct for selectivity bias. The final results are presented in Table 7. 
The coefficient of Auditor_choice is still significantly positive and consistent with 
the results of the original logit regression of the auditor opinion Model. Thus, the 
results of the Heckman logit two-stage method also provide empirical evidence that 
main bank auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions than non-main bank 
auditors after controlling the self-selection bias. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Second, I treat the member banks in a Financial Group as independent banks 
instead of treating the entire Financial Group as a main bank. Based on this criterion, 
I recalculate the main bank loans and rerun the auditor choice and auditor opinion 
models (including Propensity Matching Score Model and Heckman two-step 
model). The multivariate results in Table 4, 6 and 7 are qualitatively invariant to this 
alternative criterion. 
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Third, as mentioned above, main banks are usually the shareholders in the 
borrowing companies and their maximum ownership is capped at 5 percent. 
Although the direct ownership main banks can own is limited to 5 percent, they 
may have indirect ownership through their subsidiaries or members of Keiretsu 
Groups. Thus, the actual ownership rights of main banks in borrowing companies 
may be understated. The main banks may exert these rights to influence auditor 
selection in borrowing companies. However, it is difficult to measure the indirect 
ownership rights of main banks. Therefore, I rely on the direct ownership rights that 
main banks have to proxy for the actual ownership rights to test their influence on 
auditor choice in borrowing companies. Including the Main Bank Ownership 
variable in the auditor choice model, I finally get 1276 firm-year observations. The 
regression result shows that the coefficient of the Main Bank Ownership variable 
(MBank_Ownership) is significantly positive (0.2969), which indicates that the 
more ownership rights that main banks have in borrowing companies, the more 
likely that borrowing companies will choose main bank auditors. The results for 
MBankloan_equity and other control variables are insensitive to including the 
MBank_ownership variable and remain qualitatively consistent with the original 
results. 
Fourth, prior accounting research suggests that the absolute value of 
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discretionary accruals in audited financial statements is an indicator of the degree to 
which management is allowed by auditors to exercise accruals-based earnings 
management. (Becker et al. 1998) Thus, discretionary accrual is another way to 
measure audit quality and high quality audit is associated with conservative 
discretionary accruals. Following Krishnan (2003), I estimate discretionary accruals 
using the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) accruals estimation model.  
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model as 
follows: 
TACCRi,t/TASi,t-1=a11/TASi,t-1+a2 ∆REVi,t/TASi,t-1+a3 PPEi,t/TASi,t-1+ ei,t 
Where TACCRi,t is total accruals for firm i in year t, TASi,t-1 is total assets in year t, 
∆REVi,t is revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1, PPEi,t is property, plant, and 
equipment at the end of year t., ei,t is the error term. 
According to Krishnan (2003), total accruals are calculated as the difference 
between net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and 
cash flows from operating activities. Consistent with prior research, I estimate the 
cross-sectional Jones model separately for each combination of industry code and 
calendar year. Instead of using the two-digit US SIC codes, I use 4-digit GICS 
codes for Japanese listed companies. The error term from this Jones model 
represents the discretionary accruals. Table 8 reports the differences in three types 
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of discretionary accruals between companies choosing main bank auditors and those 
choosing non main bank auditors: absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
income-increasing (positive) discretionary accruals and income-decreasing 
(negative) discretionary accruals. The results indicate that companies choosing main 
bank auditors report less discretionary accruals than companies choosing non main 
bank auditors in all three cases. The differences in mean value are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level for the absolute value of discretionary accruals and 
income-increasing discretionary accruals. Overall, these results are consistent with 
hypothesis 2 that audit quality is higher for main bank auditors than non main bank 
auditors. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
I examine whether auditor choice is affected by the influence of main banks under 
Japan’s institutional environment and analyze the auditor opinions based on the type 
of auditors chosen, i.e., main bank auditors versus others. I expect that companies 
with higher ratios of main bank loans to equity have stronger incentives to choose 
the same external auditors as their main banks in order to reduce capital costs. I also 
expect that main bank auditors are less likely to take part in audit collusion and 
more likely to issue modified opinions to the borrowing companies than non-main 
bank auditors because of their economic relationship with the main bank. 
Using data on Japanese listed companies from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, I 
provide empirical evidence that companies with more reliance on main bank loans 
are more likely to choose their main banks’ external auditors. Using the Propensity 
Score Matching method and the Heckman two-step binary probit model to control 
for self-selection bias, the empirical results support the hypothesis that main bank 
auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to borrowing companies than 
non-main bank auditors, providing evidence of higher audit quality from main bank 
auditors. My findings contribute to the auditing literature by providing empirical 
evidence of the economic influence of creditors (main banks) on the auditor choice 
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of the borrowing companies and also on the audit quality of the auditors in a 
bank-based market. There are two primary implications of my results. 
First, unlike dispersed shareholders who can only rely on security laws to 
prevent auditor collusion with managers, main banks in Japan can discipline their 
auditors by cutting off their economic relationship with them if they provide 
substandard work. This may shed light on future analytical auditing research 
concerning agency problems among creditors, managers and auditors. 
Second, my study also has implications for auditing practice. Given that main 
bank auditors tend to provide higher quality audits, main banks could consider 
requiring borrowing companies to hire their external auditors in debt agreements to 
enhance audit quality. 
There are several limitations of this study. First, I do not include audit fees in 
the auditor choice model as Japanese listed companies do not disclose audit fee 
information. Second, I do not consider the influence of indirect ownership rights of 
main banks in borrowing companies on auditor choice as it is difficult to measure. 
Despite these limitations, my exploratory research provides an initial understanding 
of the influence of banks on auditor choice and auditor reporting in a bank-based 
debt financing economy. Future research can further explore the role of auditors in 
similar economies.  
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Notes: 
1. Shortly after the suspension, PwC acted quickly to stem client attrition by 
setting up the new PricewaterhouseCoopers Aarata. Some of ChuoAoyama's 
auditors moved to the new firm (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2010). ChuoAoyama 
resumed operations on September 1, 2006 under the Misuzu name. However, by 
this time, Misuzu had 30 percent fewer clients than did ChuoAoyama prior to its 
suspension (The Daily Yomiuri, 2006). 
 
2. During the sample period, some main banks switched their auditors. However, 
only some of their borrowing companies followed their main banks to switch to 
the new auditors. Therefore, this indicates that it is the borrowing companies' 
voluntary behavior to choose the same auditor as their main banks, rather than 
being imposed by main banks. 
 
3. I calculate the ratio of financial expense to total bank loans to proxy for the 
interest rates of total bank loans. The results indicate that the mean value of 
interest rates for companies who chose main bank auditors is significantly less 
than that for companies who chose non-main bank auditors (p-value is 0.044). 
 
4. The Rules & Regulations of the Tokyo Stock Exchange list the Summary of Criteria for 
Assignment to the First Section and Reassignment from the First Section to the Second 
Section and draw a boundary line between the First and Second Section markets in 
several respects such as number of shares listed, distribution of shares, listed market 
capitalization, amount of net assets, amount of profit, market capitalization, opinion on 
financial statements and trading volume. Companies which are above the boundary 
lines in all these aspects can be assigned to the First Section while companies which are 
below the boundary lines in any aspect are assigned or reassigned to the Second Section 
market. 
 
5. In some years, two banks merged into one larger bank; the larger bank may employ two 
auditors of the two merged banks. In this situation, I let Auditor_choice equal 1 only if 
the external auditor of the borrowing company is the same as one of these two auditors. 
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Appendix. The Main Banks in my sample and Their Auditors   
Name of Bank 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Chuo Mitsui Trust DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT DTT DTT DTT 
DBJ     CA CA CA Misuzu   DTT 
Hachijuni Bank       DTT DTT DTT DTT 
Hiroshima Bank       AZ AZ AZ AZ 
Mizuho Financial Group CA & SH    SH  SH  SH  SH  SH  SH  
Norinchukin Bank CA   CA CA CA CA SH  SH  
Resona Group   SH  SH SH&DTT SH&DTT DTT DTT 
Daiwa Bank SH              
Asahi Bank SH              
Shinsei Bank DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT DTT DTT DTT 
SMBC AS  AS  SH AZ AZ AZ AZ 
The Bank of Yokohama DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT DTT DTT DTT 
Sumitomo Trust           AZ AZ 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group 
        DTT DTT DTT 
BOTM  DTT       DTT DTT DTT       
UFJ CA&DTT CA CA CA       
Yamaguchi Bank AS AS AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ 
Chugoku Bank AS AS AZ AZ       
Hokkoku   SH SH SH SH SH SH 
Kyoto DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       
Shizuoka DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       
77BANK DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       DTT       
Chiba SH SH SH SH SH SH SH 
Notes:  
(1) Auditor abbreviation- CA: ChuoAoyama (member of PWC); AZ: AZSA (member of KPMG) 
AS: Asahi (member of AA; SH: Shin Nihon (member of EY)   
(2) Bank abbreviation- DBJ: Development Bank of Japan; BOTM: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi   
SMBC: Sumitomo Mitsui Bank Corporation 
(3) Member banks of Financial Group-Mizuho Financial Group: Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate 
Bank and Mizuho Trust and Banking 
Member banks of Resona Financial Group: Resona Bank, Saitama Resona Bank and the Kinki 
Osaka Bank 
Member banks of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ and 
Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking 
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Table 1. Descriptive information on data selection, auditor choice and auditor opinions 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2002-2008 
Panel A: Data Selection         
Sample Firms 149 198 199 262 303 617 367 2095 
 2002(%) 2003(%) 2004(%) 2005(%) 2006(%) 2007(%) 2008(%) 2001-2008(%) 
Panel B: Types of auditor Choice         
Main Bank Auditor 64(43) 62(31) 63(32) 85(32) 94(31) 173(28) 119(32) 660(32) 
Non-Main Bank Auditor 85(57) 136(69) 136(68) 177(68) 209(69) 444(72) 248(68) 1435(68) 
Total 149 198 199 262 303 617 367 2095 
 2002(%) 2003(%) 2004(%) 2005(%) 2006(%) 2007(%) 2008(%) 2001-2008(%) 
Panel C: Types of audit opinion         
Unqualified 118(80) 175(88) 198(99) 259(99) 296(98) 608(99) 360(98) 2014(96) 
Modified  31(20) 23(12) 1(1)  3(1) 7(2) 9(1) 7(2) 81(4) 
Total  149 198 199 262 303 617 367 2095 
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Table 1. Descriptive information on data selection, auditor choice and 
auditor opinions 
Panel D: Auditor Opinion by Auditor Type 
  Main Bank Auditors   Non-Main Bank Auditors  
 Modified % Unqualified % Total Modified % Unqualified % Total 
2002 12 18.8
5555 
52 81.2 64 19 22.4 66 77.6 85 
2003 10 16.1 52 83.9 62 13   9.6 123 90.4 136 
2004 1  1.6 62 98.4
1 
63 0 0 136 100 136 
2005 2  2.4 83 97.6
5 
85 1    0.1 176 99.9 177 
2006 3  3.2 91 96.8 94 4   1.9 205 98.1 209 
2007 3  1.7 170 98.3 173 6   1.4 438 98.6 444 
2008 1  0.8 118 99.2 119 6   2.4 242 97.6 248 
Total 32 4.8 628 95.2 660 49 3.4 1386 94.2 1435 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistic of Regression Variables 
Variable Mean Sd min median Max 
Auditor_choice 0.315 0.465 0 0 1 
Auditor_opinion 0.039 0.193 0 0 1 
Opinion_lag 0.042 0.201 0 0 1 
MBankloan_equity 0.180 0.237 -0.573 0.103 2.685 
Leverage 0.637 0.149 0.174 0.652 1.221 
Current_ratio 1.318 0.564 0.076 1.208 4.971 
Size 19.030 1.545 15.094 18.976 23.187 
ROA 0.037 0.046 -0.276 0.035 0.411 
Loss 0.111 0.314 0 0 1 
growth 0.048 0.116 -0.841 0.041 1.563 
Market 
 
0.877 0.328 0 1 1 
Beta 0.882 2.020 -0.120 0.840 92.000 
No.Subsidiary 
 
 
19.890 47.058 0 2 534 
 
 
Inventory 0.132 0.076 0 0.125 0.526 
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Panel B: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Auditor_choice Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is the same as its 
main bank, and 0 otherwise 
Auditor_opinion Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s audit opinion is modified 
for the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. I classify qualified opinions, 
adverse opinions and disclaim as “modified opinions” 
Opinion_lag Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s audit opinion is modified 
for the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
MBankloan_equity The ratio of year-end main bank loans to shareholders funds (equity) 
Leverage The ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets 
Current_ratio The ratio of year-end current assets to current liabilities 
Size The natural logarithm of year-end total assets (Japan Yuan) 
ROA The ratio of net income before tax to year-end total assets 
Loss 
 
Market 
 
Beta 
Inventory 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the net income before tax less than 
zero, otherwise 0. 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the company is in the First Section 
Market in the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Beta coefficient of the Capital Asset Pricing Model   
Year-end inventory divided by year-end total assets 
Growth (Total sales of current year divided by total sales of previous year)-1 
Year2007 Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the fiscal year is 2007 
Year2008 
Mymills 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the fiscal year is 2008 
Inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-step model 
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics of firm characteristic variables partitioned   
         by Auditor Type (N=2095) 
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Firm Characteristics Statistics Non-Main Bank’s Auditor Main Bank’s Auditor P-Value 
Auditor_opinion Mean 0.034 0.048 0.1139 
 S.D. 0.182 0.215  
MBankloan_equity Mean 0.170 0.202 0.0047
***
 
 S.D. 0.205 0.294  
Leverage Mean 0.631 0.651 0.0042
***
 
 S.D. 0.147 0.152  
Current_ratio Mean 1.332 1.289 0.1049 
 S.D. 0.555 0.582  
Size Mean 18.974 19.151 0.0150
**
 
 S.D. 1.559 1.506  
ROA Mean 0.037 0.036 0.5953 
 S.D. 0.047 0.043  
Loss Mean 0.109 0.115 0.6627 
 S.D. 0.311 0.319  
Growth Mean 0.048 0.050 0.7405 
 
 
S.D. 0.119 0.111  
Market 
 
Mean 0.861 0.912 0.001
***
 
  S.D. 0.346 0.283  
 Beta Mean 0.889 0.866 0.8102 
 S.D. 2.431 0.333  
No.Subsidiary Mean 18.756 22.356 0.1038 
 S.D. 43.560 53.838  
Inventory Mean 0.130 0.134 0.2768 
 S.D. 0.074 0.080  
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for Auditor Choice Model 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients Z-statistics P-Value 
Explanatory Variables         
Constant ? -1.5297 -1.72 0.086
*
 
MBankloan_equity + 0.6769 2.68 0.007
***
 
Leverage + 0.1882 0.34 0.731 
Market + 0.5768 3.06 0.002
***
 
No.Subsidiary + 0.0011 0.89 0.376 
Current_ratio _ -0.0365 -0.3 0.766 
Size - -0.0022 -0.05 0.964 
ROA + 0.4581 0.38 0.705 
Inventory  0.7066 1.06 0.288 
Growth + 0.2522 0.58 0.564 
Year_dumb2007 ? -0.1957 -1.68 0.093
*
 
Year_dumb2008 ? -0.0235 -0.17 0.864 
Pseudo R-squared    0.0121 
Sample Size       2095 
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Mean value of firm characteristics partitioned by Auditor Type for 
the matched-pairs subsample (N=1130) 
Firm Characteristics Non-Main Bank’s Auditor Main Bank’s Auditor P-Value 
MBankloan_equity 0.182 0.184 0.9208 
Leverage 0.640 0.646 0.5422 
Current_ratio 1.322 1.294 0.4069 
Size 19.148 19.125 0.7984 
ROA 0.037 0.036 0.6958 
Loss 0.122 0.115 0.7131 
Beta 0.855 0.863 0.6996 
Market 
Inventory 
0.915 
0.132 
0.904 
0.134 
0.5338 
0.5419 Inventory 0.132 0.134 0.5419 
No.Subsidiary 21.393 20.142 0.6651 
Growth 0.046 0.049 0.6692 
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed. 
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Table 6. Logistic regression results for Auditor Opinion Model 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Original Sample Sub-sample after PSM 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
Explanatory Variables      
Constants ? -2.2527  0.2190 -2.0295  0.4550 
Auditor_Choice + 0.5906 0.0290
**
 0.8943 0.0300
**
 
Opinion_lag + 3.4178  0.0000
***
 3.9867 0.0000
**
*
 Leverage + -1.6405  0.1560 -1.3844  0.4270 
Current_ratio - 0.0276 0.9200 -0.0136   0.9730 
Size - 0.0001  0.9990 -0.0462 0.7750 
ROA - -7.7441 0.0200
**
 -5.2152 0.3060 
Loss + 0.2202 0.6250 0.7356  0.2630 
Beta - -0.1069 0.7990 0.3805 0.5150 
Market - -0.8326 0.0510
*
 -1.2283 0.0540
*
 
Inventory + 1.3068 0.4680 0.2741 0.9180 
Pseudo R2   0.2570  0.3524 
Sample Size   2095  1130 
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Heckman second-stage Logit regression results for Audit Opinion 
Model 
 
 Predicte
d Sign 
Original Sample    Adjusted by Inverse 
mills 
 Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
Explanatory Variables      
Constants ? -2.2527  0.2190 -0.2166 0.943
0 
Auditor_Choice + 0.5906  0.0290
**
 0.5501 0.046
*
*
 Opinion_lag + 3.4178    0.0000
***
 3.3566  
0.0000
***
 Leverage + -1.6405  0.1560 -2.2550 0.101
0 Current_ratio - 0.0276 0.9200 0.0466 0.8670 
Size - 0.0001  0.9990 0.0142 0.8980 
ROA - -7.7441  0.0200
**
 -8.0797  0.0170
**
 
Loss + 0.2202 0.6250 -0.1951 0.6670 
Beta - -0.1069 0.7990 -0.0922 0.8270 
Market - -0.8326  0.0510
*
 -1.1957   
0.0490
**
 Inventory + 1.3068 0.4680 1.0426  0.5670 
Inverse Mills ?     -1.3799  0.4000 
Pseudo R2   0.2570   0.258 
Sample Size   2095   2095 
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Table 8 Mean value of discretionary accruals partitioned by Auditor type 
 
Type of Accruals 
Mean 
p-value main bank 
auditors 
non main bank 
auditor 
Absolute Discretionary Accruals 0.0221 0.0247 0.0408
**
 
Income-increasing Discretionary 
Accruals 
0.0212 0.0251 0.0298
**
 
Income-decreasing Discretionary 
Accruals 
-0.0227 -0.0246 0.2001 
Notes: all p-values are one-tail. The sample consists of 1115 firm-year 
observations. The number of cross-sectional regressions based on combination of 
4-digit GICS code and calendar year is 49. 
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